Abstract: This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model of economic growth. The model has a steady state equilibrium in which some firms devote resources to discovering qualitatively improved products and other firms devote resources to copying these products. Rates of both innovation and imitation are endogenously determined based on the outcomes of R&D races between firms. Innovation subsidies are shown to unambiguously promote economic growth. Welfare is only enhanced however if the steady state intensity of innovative effort exceeds a critical level. JEL Classification Numbers: 110, 620.
Introductionl
Economic growth is fueled both by innovation and imitation. Firms invest significant resources in research and development (R&D) activities to discover qualitatively improved products and capture associated profits. When they are successful, other firms, attracted by these profits, imitate and thus they accelerate the development and production of new products. While the innovation-imitation debate may be the focus of boardroom discussions, the theoretical literature on R&D races between firms focuses almost exclusively on the development of new products or processes. 2 Failing to address the incentives that firms have to engage in costly imitative activities, these models ignore the obvious feedback effect imitation has on the incentive to innovate. The rate of imitation in this literature is typically exogenously determined based on perfectly enforced finite patents, or the possibilities for imitation are ignored altogether. 3 This contrasts sharply with the empirical evidence. Tilton (1971) , for example, found that the lag time between the initial discovery of semiconductor innovations by American firms and the first commercial production by Japanese firms averaged just one year. Mansfield, Schwartz and Wagner (1981) found that 60% of the patented innovations they studied were imitated within four years.
In this paper, I present a dynamic general equilibrium model of economic growth. In this model, throughout time, firms can enter into both innovative and imitative R&D races in each industry. The winner of each innovative R&D race discovers how to produce a new superior product and the winner of each imitative R&D race discovers how to produce the stateof-the-art quality product. Both the pace and the direction of R&D activities are determined based on expected discounted profit maximizing considerations. Consumers maximize their discounted utilities and all markets clear throughout time.
1 I thank Carl Davidson, Elias Dinopoulos, James Oehmke, Susan Linz and participants in the Midwest International Economics Conference (May 11-13, Indiana University) for insightful comments on the preliminary version of this paper. Of course, all errors are my own responsibility.
2 The reader is referred to Dasgupta (1988) , Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) , Katz and Shapiro (1987) , Lee and Wilde (1980) , Loury (1979) , Reinganum (1982) , and Spence (1984) for further references.
3 Partial equilibrium models in which firms can choose between innovating and imitating have been developed by Baldwin and Childs (1969) , Cheng (1989) , and Jovanovic and MacDonald (1988). innovative and imitative activities. My equilibrium also has the property that market concentration levels fluctuate over time in each industry. Grossman and Helpman (1989b) have recently extended their earlier analysis to include costly imitative R&D. Indeed, the present paper shares the same assumptions about consumer preferences and the structure of R&D races. There are important differences in analysis, however. 5 Grossman and Helpman use the static Bertrand equilibrium concept to analyze dynamic product market competition and thus they implicitly assume that a perfectly competitive outcome arises whenever two identical cost firms are active in any market. In contrast, in this paper, whenever firms are in a position to collude, with any possible cheating deterred by subgame perfect equilibrium punishment threats, firms are assumed to take advantage of the opportunity. And in the highly concentrated markets that result from innovation and imitation, I
show that mutually beneficial collusion between thins is feasible.
In Grossman and Helpman (1989b) , imitative R&D is driven by factor price differences across countries. In their steady state equilibrium, imitation always involves firms in the South copying products developed in the North. Although factor price differences across countries are clearly important, by ignoring these differences, this paper shows that they are not necessary to explain why firms engage in costly imitative activities. Thus this paper provides an explanation for an important empirical phenomenon: firms in the North copying products developed by other firms in the North.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The dynamic general equilibrium model of innovation and imitation is presented in section 2. In section 3, I show that this model has a steady state equilibrium in which some firms engage in costly innovative activities and other firms engage in costly imitative activities. Section 4 explores the comparative steady state equilibrium properties of this model and section 5 contains some concluding remarks.
The Model
I consider an economy with a continuum of industries indexed by to E [0,11. Products in each industry can be supplied in a countable number of qualities MI of the 5 Differences in implications will be discussed in section 4.
consumers live forever and have identical preferences. The intertemporal utility function for the representative consumer is given by
where p is the subjective discount rate, and u(t) is the consumer's instantaneous utility at time t. This instantaneous utility is given by u(t)' hAlkdi,(condo.),
where dj,(w) denotes the quantity consumed of a product of quality j produced by industry w at time 4 and X >1 represents the extent to which higher quality products improve upon lower quality products 6. Every consumer maximizes discounted utility subject to an intertemporal budget constraint (3) J.: C R(' ) E( t)dt = A (0 ) , where R(t) is the cumulative interest factor up to time t, A(0) is the value of asset holdings at time t=0 plus the present value of future factor income, and E(t) is the consumer's expenditure flow at time t. Of course, the consumer's expenditure flow at time t is given by r-
where p itco) is the price of a product of quality j produced by industry w at time 1.7 6 This is the same instantaneous utility function as was used in Grossman and Helpman (1989a) . The "finite number of indusiries" version of this CDP (Cobb-Douglas with Perfect Substitutes) utility function was introduced in Segerstrom, Anant and Dinopoulos (1987) to study product innovation and replacement.
7 In this model, price competition between rums forces all firms producing the same quality product to charge the
Labor is homogeneous, the only factor of production, and the economy-wide endowment of labor L is constant over time. is an infinitesimal increment of time). The returns to engaging in innovative R&D are assumed to be independently distributed across firms, across industries, and over time. 8 As described, each innovative R&D race has the same structure as in Lee and Wilde (1980) .9
A firm that discovers a new superior quality product becomes the sole producer of this product. But this monopoly position does not necessarily last forever. Other firms can engage in imitative R&D activities to learn how to produce state-of-the-art quality products in each industry 10. For each firm, a unit of imitative R&D activity requires ac units of labor per unit of same price.
8 Thus, if fins chose constant R&D expenditures over time, the time duration of each R&D race will be exponentially distributed.
9 The Lee-Wilde R&D structure has been used to study R&D subsidies and taxes in an international setting by Dixit (1988) .
10 The licensing of innovations is not explicitly considered, in this paper, as a viable option for firms. However, the transaction costs and asymmetric information problems associated with licensing limit firms' abilities to achieve the licensing gains from trade. In the Mansfield et. al. (1981) empirical study of imitation costs, only 1 out of 48 time ("C stands for "Copying"). By undertaking C units of imitative R&D in industry e[0,1] at time t, a firm is successful in discovering how to produce the state-of-the-art quality product in that industry with instantaneous probability C. The returns to engaging in imitative R&D are assumed to be independently distributed across fums, across industries, and across time. As described, each imitative R&D race has the same structure as each innovative R&D race. The idea that firms can imitate more easily than innovate is captured by assumingl Al ac>0.
The labor market in this economy is assumed to be perfectly competitive and all workers earn the same equilibrium wage which I normalize to equal one throughout time. In each industry, firms set prices and face no capacity constraints. 12 Since all the firms in an industry to 6[0,1] producing a quality j product are producing identical products, consumers will only (possibly) buy from the firms that sell the quality j product for the lowest price. At each moment in time, all firms set prices simultaneously and independently. However, it takes time for firms to learn about and react to the prices being charged by other fums and I assume that this time lag 2 >0 is the same for all firms throughout time. 13 Thus a decision by any firm to change its price at time t does not go into effect until time t+ E.
Finally, I assume the existence of a capital market which supplies the savings of consumers to firms engaged in R&D. The equilibrium interest rate 1.(t)9d/20)1dt clears this market at each moment in time. Firms borrow funds from this market to pay workers as the R&D is done. Each firm issues a risky security that yields a positive return if it wins an R&D race and a negative return if it loses. Since there is a continuum of industries and the returns to engaging in R&D are independently distributed both across firms and across industries, by cases involved an innovator licensing to the imitating firm.
11 In their empirical study of imitation costs, Mansfield, et. al. (1981) found that the ratio of imitation costs to innovation costs was .65 on average.
12 By assuming that price (instead of quantity) is the strategic choice of rims, I am implicitly assuming that each firm can adjust its production level more easily than its price. See Friedman (1983, p. 46-48) .
13 This time lag plays the same role in the present paper as the length of a time period in the literature on pricesetting supergames. See, for example, Lambson (1987) .
holding a diversified portfolio of securities, investors are able to completely diversify away risk.
Thus free entry into R&D implies that firms keep on entering each R&D race until expected discounted profits are driven to zero. This completes the description of the model.
The Steady State Equilibrium
In this section, I solve for a steady state equilibrium for the previously described model with the following basic properties: (i) both individual and aggregate consumer expenditure are constant over time, (ii) the market rate of interest is constant over time and equal to each consumer's subjective discount rate, (iii) in industries with a single firm producing the state-ofthe-art quality product (a single quality leader), other firms engage in imitative but not innovative R&D, (iv) in industries with two firms producing the state-of-the-art quality product (two quality leaders), other firms engage in innovative but not imitative R&D, (v) 
where .1(o3) is the set of available quality levels with the lowest quality adjusted prices
, and he Iii(w) is the highest quality level in .1;(w). I assume that, among the firms charging the lowest quality adjusted prices, consumers only buy from the firms which sell the highest quality products. Then (5) yields static demand functions
Solving for the time path of spending E(t) that maximizes discounted utility U for the representative consumer involves substituting (2) and (6) into (1) and maximizing this expression subject to the constraint (3). The Euler equation for this calculus of variations problem yields (7) implies that any steady state equilibrium in consumer expenditure must involve a constant market interest rate r(t) over time which is equal to the consumer's subjective discount rate.
Thus, given the basic property of steady state equilibria (i), property (ii) follows from utility maximization. The actual level of expenditure E is determined by the consumer's steady state assets A. Since all consumers have identical homothetic preferences, in the rest of this paper, I
(5) (6) (7) will let E denote aggregate steady state expenditure and let (6) represent aggregate demand functions.
Turning to the production side of the economy, since constant returns to scale prevail in the production of every product, with one unit of labor producing one unit of output, firms that produce state-of-the-art quality products have an advantage over all other firms. When all other firms are charging a price of one, the lowest price such that they do not make losses, a firm which is a single quality leader earns instantaneous profits
where p is the quality leader's price. These profits are obviously maximized by choosing 
In both cases, the market price of a quality leader is given by (10), and no other firms sell anything in equilibrium. Firms that can (but do not, in equilibrium) produce lower quality products serve to constrain quality leaders from charging prices higher than X .
To justify (11), I must show that, in an industry with two quality leaders, these firms are in a position to collude and each earn the profit flow IC. Given property (iv) of the steady state equilibrium, these collusive profit flows are only earned until some other firm succeeds in innovating, and discovering a still higher quality product. Letting I denote the aggregate level of innovative activity in this industry (in the steady state equilibrium), and using the fact that the time lag "C until a higher quality product is discovered is exponentially distributed, the expected discounted profits from colluding are
Alternatively, one of these quality leaders could cheat on the collusive agreement. Letting C n denote the profit flows that a quality leader earns from cheating, and recognizing that cheating is detected after a time lag 2 , the expected discounted profits from cheating are
The first bracketed expression on the LHS of (13) is the discounted profits from cheating given that a new higher quality product is discovered before cheating is detected. Since the expected discounted profits from engaging in R&D equal zero, a cheater can expect to earn nothing after another firm innovates. These discounted profits are weighted by the probability that further innovation occurs before the cheating in detected. The second expression on the LHS of (13) is the discounted profits from cheating given that this cheating is detected before another firm successfully innovates, weighted by the probability that further innovation does not occur before the cheating is detected. Then the firm that was cheated on can punish the cheater by charging a price of one for its product. By charging such a price, the punisher guarantees that the cheater earns nonpositive profit flows. The punisher can carry out this punishment indefinitely (as is the case with Friedman's (1971) trigger strategies), or carry out this punishment for a period of length t if the cheater "repents" by charging price below one during this time period and then return to behaving collusively (as is the case with Segerstrom's (1988) repentance strategies). In either case, the cheater earns expected discounted equilibrium profits of zero subsequent to being detected for cheating. Since cheating profit flows are maximized by charging a price infinitesimally below X and undercutting the other quality leader, Ic e" , 21cc . Now putting (12) and (13) together, I conclude that neither of the two quality leaders has an incentive to cheat on collusive behavior if
where f* is the steady state level of innovative R&D.
In the appendix, I introduce some additional parameter value restrictions which guarantee that (14) is satisfied. I essentially assume that the labor force L is sufficiently small and thus the pace of innovative activity is positive but sufficiently slow so that two quality leaders find it attractive to collude. I also assume that steps up in the quality ladder are sufficiently large so that firms producing different quality products in an industry are not able to successfully collude (using subgame perfect equilibrium strategies), thus justifying (10) and (11). 15 In industries with two quality leaders, I rule out the possibility that these firms might charge prices higher than A and collude with firms producing lower quality products. In industries with a single quality leader, I rule out the possibility that this quality leader might charge a price higher than A. and collude with lams producing lower quality products. And in industries with two quality leaders, I show that no firm has any incentive to engage in imitative R&D, from which it follows that there never are any industries with three or more quality leaders.
Property (xi) states that the proportion of industries with a single quality leader is a constant over time. I will denote this proportion a. Since no industry has more than two quality 15 These assumptions are made to keep the discussion from becoming taxonomic.
leaders at any moment in time (vi), the proportion of industries with two quality leaders 13 equals 1-a. Firms only engage in imitative R&D in a industries (iii) and firms only engage in innovative R&D in 13 industries (iv). Thus, when innovation occurs in an industry, this industry switches from being a "(1 industry" to being an "a industry", and when imitation occurs in an industry, this industry switches from being an "a industry" to being a "f3 industry". This structure of the steady state equilibrium is summarized in the following figure:
Imitation cc industries 1 leader, 2 followers
Innovation

Figure 1
To maintain a steady state equilibrium, every time a new superior quality product is discovered in some industry, imitation must occur in some other industry. That is,
ccEdt=--Pldt (15) states that the rate at which industries leave the a group must equal the rate at which industries leave the (3 group. It follows that the steady state proportion of "a industries" is a = I I (C + I) and the steady state proportion of "13 industries" is 13= C /(C + I).
In all industries, the price >1 is charged by all quality leaders and firms producing lower quality products sell nothing. From (6), I can conclude that the steady state aggregate demand for production workers in these industries is E I A.. Since innovation only takes place in "(3 industries" and imitation only takes place in "cc industries", the labor market (or full employment) condition is
Substituting in for a and the steady state labor market condition can be written as
To explore the incentives firms have to engage in imitative activities, let vc denote the expected discounted reward for winning an imitative R&D race and let ti denote the random time duration of an imitative R&D race. Since ti is exponentially distributed, the expected benefit from engaging in imitative R&D in an industry is
The expected cost from engaging in imitative R&D in an industry is
Thus the expected profit from engaging in imitative R&D is
Free entry into imitative R&D races then implies that vc = ac in each imitative R&D race. But what does vc equal? A successful imitator in an industry earns the collusive profit flow it c until some other firm succeeds in innovating and starts producing a higher quality product. Since the time duration of innovative R&D races is exponentially distibuted,
space:
15
Substituting for E in (17) using (11) and (21) 
The function C(1) defines, for each level of innovative investment 1, how much imitative investment is consistent with full employment of labor in the economy, and zero discounted profits in each imitative R&D race. Thus the CL(1) function can be interpreted as a steady state equilibrium labor market constraint. Note that CL(1) is unambiguously downward sloping in the positive orthant. Given a fixed endowment of labor in the world, more innovative R&D in 13
industries" means less labor is available to do imitative R&D in "a industries".
To explore the incentives firms have to engage in innovative activities, let vl denote the expected discounted reward for winning an innovative R&D race and let ti denote the random time duration of an innovative R&D race. Since t is exponentially distributed, the expected benefit from engaging in innovative R&D in an industry is
The expected cost from engaging in innovative R&D in an industry is
(25) 5:{foalle-Psds}Ie-hdt /(p + I). I).
Thus the expected profit from engaging in innovative R&D is
Free entry into innovative R&D races then implies that v, = a, in each innovative R&D race. But what does v, equal? A successful innovator in an industry earns the dominant firm profit flow n it until some other rum succeeds in imitating, and then it has to share these profits with the imitator. Since the time duration of imitative R&D races is exponentially distributed,
p+C I am now in a position to solve for the levels of innovative and imitative R&D consistent with zero expected discounted profits in both types of R&D races. Combining (10), (11), (21) and (27) yields
This C,(I) function defines, for every level of innovative investment I, how much imitative investment is consistent with zero expected discounted profits in each R&D race (both innovative and imitative). Thus I can interpret CI(I) as a steady state equilibrium zero profit in R&D constraint.
Given Al, C1 (1) is unambiguously positively sloped. The intuition behind this positive slope is somewhat involved: Increasing C means that innovative firms enjoy earning dominant firm profits for a shorter expected period of time. Since firms earn zero expected discounted profits from engaging in innovative R&D, they must be able to earn higher dominant firm profit flows during this shorter expected period of time. But higher dominant firm profit flows imply higher collusive profit flows. It follows that to satisfy the zero profit in imitative R&D condition (26) (21), there must be higher innovative R&D /. Then these imitators earn the higher collusive profits for a shorter expected period of time. To summarize, to maintain zero expected discounted profits in both innovative and imitative R&D races, when imitative R&D C increases, innovative R&D I must also increase.
The Cf(I) and CL(I) functions are illustrated in Figure At this steady state equilibrium, I can calculate the growth rate of static utility (2) for the representative consumer. This gives me a perfect measure of economic growth. Substituting (6) and (9) into (2) yields
where h h,(w) is the state-of-the-art quality level in industry co at time t. h only changes when firms are successful in innovating, and firms only engage in innovative R&D in 13= C / (C+ I) industries at a time. For any co in the 11 industries, the probability of exactly In 16 As illustrated in Figure 2 , there also exists another intersection of the two functions, but since it is associated with negative imitative investment, it is economically meaningless and can be ignored. Using (29) and (31), the steady state utility growth rate is
Thus, not only does higher I and higher X (bigger steps in the quality ladder) lead to higher steady state economic growth, but also higher C has the same effect. This latter conclusion may appear puzzling since imitative R&D activities just lead to a redistribution of profits and do not directly benefit consumers in the steady state equilibrium. Successful imitators collude with previous quality leaders and thus consumers do not see any drop in the market price when a state-of-the-art quality product is copied. However higher rates of imitation C (holding I Ivied) also means that firms engage in innovative R&D I in a larger proportion of industries and this is what drives the higher economic growth.
Treating X as fixed, I can use (32) to define iso-growth curves in (C,I) space. These iso-growth curves are illustrated in Figure 3 . As drawn, movements in the northwest direction along the labor market constraint C= CL(I) are associated with higher economic growth. This property follows directly from (22) and plays an important role in the comparative steady state analysis which follows.
I can also make welfare statements by calculating the steady state discounted utility of the representative consumer under alternative public policy regimes, starting at t=0 where ho(co) = 0 for all w. Substituting (31) and (29) into (1) yields (33) U = 449+ 11 P P • Thus, there is a trade-off between current expenditure and economic growth. As we will see, policy changes that increase growth can decrease welfare if they have a sufficiently negative effect on current expenditure.
Comparative Steady State Analysis
In this section, I explore the steady state equilibrium effects of government subsidies to innovation and imitation. I also look at the effects of entry taxes imposed on successful imitators as well as the effects of exogenous changes in basic parameters of the model The intuition behind Proposition 1 is straightforward to explain. When the government subsidy to innovative R&D s, is increased, the cost of engaging in innovative R&D is reduced.
Since firms earn zero expected discounted profits from engaging in innovative R&D, the benefit from winning an innovative R&D race must go down also. Firms that are successful in innovating must earn dominant firm profits for a shorter expected period of time, that is, there must be a faster rate of imitation. But given a fixed economy wide labor force L, any increase in the intensity of imitative R&D C* must be offset by a decrease in the intensity of innovative R&D I*. Thus, innovative R&D subsidies must lower the steady state intensity of innovative R&D in each industry where firms engage in innovative R&D races. I also know that with a higher rate of imitation, firms find it profitable to engage in innovative R&D races in a larger proportion of industries. Thus, even though innovative R&D subsidies lower the intensity of innovative effort, since this effort applies to a larger proportion of industries, the steady state rate of economic growth unambiguously increases.
Even though innovation subsidies increase economic growth, it does not follow that they are good for society. From (33), I know that steady state discounted utility for the representative consumer is an increasing function of both economic growth and steady state expenditure. Since innovation subsidies decrease P, it follows from (11) and (21) that they also decrease steady state expenditure. Thus the effect of innovation subsidies on economic welfare is, on the surface, ambiguous.
To resolve this issue, I must explore how movements along the labor market constraint (23) change welfare. Substituting (11) and (21) Proposition 2 is rather surprising. It essentially states that innovation subsidies, on the margin, are harmful if the intensity of innovative effort is low to begin with. Only when the intensity of innovative effort is relatively high do innovation subsidies raise welfare. There is an intuitive explanation for this conclusion, however. When the economy-wide labor force is relatively small, both steady state intensities of innovative and imitative investment (I* and C*)
are relatively low, in particular, I* < I . Under these circumstances, funs that are successful in innovating can expect to earn dominant firm profits for a long period of time, and there is a market bias towards over-investment in innovative R&D. On the other hand, when the economy-wide labor force is relatively large, both steady state intensities of innovative and imitative investment (I* and C*) are relatively high, in particular, I* > I. Under these circumstances, for ms that are successful in innovating can expect to earn dominant firm profits for a short period of time. Since the benefits to society from an innovation last forever, there is a market bias towards under-investment in innovative R&D. Because innovative R&D subsidies increase the resources used by the R&D sector, when there is a market bias toward overinvestment, a marginal increase in the innovation subsidy lowers welfare, and when there is a market bias toward under-investment in innovative R&D, a marginal increase in the innovation subsidy raises welfare.
What happens when the government subsidizes imitative R&D? Let s c denote the fraction of imitative R&D costs borne by the government. Then I must multiply the right-hand side of (21) by 1-sc . This changes both the zero profit in R&D constraint and the labor market
constraint. The labor market constraint (22) becomes 2 ac (p + 1)(1-sc) IC(a, + ac) L (36)
and the zero profit in R&D constraint can be rewritten as cli p+ C(a,-ac + scac) (37) (P + /)(1 -sc)-2ac.
It is easily verified that a marginal increase in sc shifts both the "zero profit in R&D constraint" It is interesting to contrast the results concerning innovation and imitation subsidies with those derived by Grossman and Helpman (1989b) (this paper assumes that followers are equally efficient), Grossman and Helpman proved that innovation subsidies increase steady state economic growth but reduce the aggregate rate of imitation in the South. They also proved that, with relatively efficient followers, imitation subsidies decrease steady state economic growth but increase the aggregate rate of imitation in the South. Thus they found an inverse relationship between policies that support learning in one R&D sector and the equilibrium rate of learning in the other. In this paper, innovation subsidies also unambiguously increase economic growth (Proposition 1), but the effect of imitation subsidies on economic growth was shown to be ambiguous. Furthermore, I found a direct relationship between policies that support learning in one R&D sector and the equilibrium rate of learning in the other. The rate at which "a industries" become industries" (the aggregate rate of imitation) is exactly balanced by the rate at which "D industries" become "cc industries" (the aggregate rate of economic growth) in the steady state equilibrium. Thus policies that support learning in one R&D sector automatically support learning in the other R&D sector.
What are the steady state effects of a once-and-for-all increase in the unit labor The effect of an increase in a, on steady state innovative R&D P is unclear since it depends on the magnitudes of the two downward shifts. The intuition behind this ambiguous effect can be understood by breaking up the movement from point A to point B into two parts: (i) the movement from A to C and (ii) the movement from C to B (in Figure 4) . When a increases, this increases the costs of engaging in innovative R&D. Since firms earn zero discounted profits from engaging in innovative R&D, the benefits from engaging in innovative R&D must go up also. Thus firms that are successful in innovating must earn dominant firm profits for a longer period of time, i.e., a slower rate of imitation (the C1(1) curve shifts down). But given the labor market constraint, lower C* corresponds to higher 1*. This explains why an increase in a, can lead to a higher innovation rate I* (and is captured by the movement from A to C along the However, by breaking up the steady state effect of an increase a, into a substitution effect and a labor market effect, it is clear why both steady state imitative R&D C* and economic growth g* decline. When a, increases, to maintain zero profits in innovative R&D, the reward for winning an innovative R&D race must rise. Less imitative R&D C* makes innovating more attractive since successful innovators earn dominant firm profits for a longer expected period of time. Thus, an increase in a, causes a substitution effect which reduces imitative R&D. The substitution effect from C* into I* also reduces economic growth since lower imitative R&D implies that firms are engaging in innovative R&D in a smaller proportion of industries. At the same time, an increase in a, causes a labor market effect which also reduces both imitative R&D and economic growth. Given the fixed economy-wide labor endowment L, an increase in the resource cost of innovative R&D means that the economy is able to support less innovative and imitative R&D. With both kinds of R&D reduced, obviously economic growth suffers as well. Thus both substitution and labor market effects of an increase in a, work together to reduce both C* and C. By breaking up the steady state effect of an increase in a c into a substitution effect and a labor market effect, it is clear why steady state innovative R&D l* unambiguously declines.
When ac increases, to maintain zero profits in imitative R&D, the reward for winning an imitative R&D race must rise. Less innovative R&D /* makes imitating more attractive since successful imitators earn collusive profits for a longer expected period of time. Thus, an increase in a causes a substitution effect from l* into C* which reduces innovative R&D. At the same time, an increase in ac causes a labor market effect. Given the fixed economy-wide labor endowment L, an increase in the unit labor requirement of imitative R&D means that the economy is able to sustain less of both innovative and imitative R&D. Thus both substitution and labor market effects of an increase in ac work together to reduce I*.
A once and for all increase in the representative consumer's subjective discount rate p (the future becomes more heavily discounted or less important) unambiguously shifts the P, but has a unclear effects on both steady state economic growth g* and imitative R&D C*.
A once and for all increase in the world endowment of labor L has no effect on the "zero profit in R&D constraint" CL(1) but unambiguously shifts up the "labor market constraint"
An increase in L unambiguously increases steady state innovative R&D l*, imitative R&D C* and economic growth g*. This anti-Malthusian conclusion, that population growth spurs on per capita economic growth, is shared with other recent models of economic growth, including Grossman and Helpman (1989a) and Romer (1988) 17. The intuition behind this property of the model is easy to explain. A larger world population means not only that there are more workers but also that there are more consumers and increased demand for the new products that firms discover. Since firms have more to gain from both innovative and imitative R&D, it
should not be surprising that a larger resource base generates faster economic growth.
A once and for all increase in the "significance of innovations" parameter R (the extent to which new products improve upon old products) has no effect on the "zero profit in R&D constraint" C1(1) but unambiguously shifts up the "labor market constraint" CL(I). Thus, an increase in R unambiguously increases steady state innovative R&D I*, imitative R&D C* and economic growth g*. Increases in the economy-wide labor endowment L and increases in the "significance of innovations" parameter A have the same qualitative effects because they both generate higher dominant firm profits.
I now turn to analyzing an explicit public policy intervention: a one time lump sum entry tax T payed by a successful imitator to the quality leader that it imitated. I want to explore 17 Strictly speaking, labor in this model corresponds to human capital in Romer's multi-factor model since Romer assumes that labor is not an input in the R&D proccess. Although Romer's growth model and the model in this paper are very different, they do share some similar properties. In Romer's model, new designs can be used by any firm to create still newer designs. In this paper, all firms can engage in innovative R&D and no firm is handicapped in these races by not being a quality leader.
whether such a tax promotes economic growth by enhancing the incentives firms have to innovate. The presence of this entry tax T changes the incentives firms have to engage in imitative R&D. (21) becomes
Substituting (38) and (11) into (17) yields a new labor market constraint which is slightly different from (22):
By changing the reward to being imitated, this entry tax also changes the incentives firms have to
Substituting (38), (10) and (11) into (40) yields a new zero profit in R&D constraint which is slightly different from (28):
I am now in a position to analyze the steady state equilibrium effects of an increase in the entry tax T. Increasing T shifts the CO) function unambiguously up and shifts the CL(1) function (defined by (39)) unambiguously down. It follows that an increase in T unambiguously reduces steady state innovative R&D 1* but has ambiguous effects on both steady state imitative R&D C* and economic growth g*. Thus it is unclear whether such an entry tax promotes economic growth.
But what happens when the government combines this entry tax with a policy which makes it easier for firms to imitate new technological developments? The government can reduce the unit labor requirement of imitative R&D ac by, for example, weaker enforcement of the patent laws. Then firms do not have to spend so much time and resources inventing their way around patents. But after they succeed in imitating a quality leader, I will suppose that they have to pay an entry tax to the quality leader (to compensate this firm for the damages caused by being imitated). I will look at the case where AT = -Aa e , that is, where any increase in the entry tax T is offset one for one with a decrease in the resource cost of imitative R&D ac..
Under these circumstances, an increase in T shifts up both the zero profit in R&D constraint
) and the labor market constraint CL(1) (defined by (39)) unambiguously up. It follows that the "AT = +1,Aac = -1" policy unambiguously increases steady state economic growth g*.
This unambiguous growth effect stands in sharp contrast to the ambiguous effect of al, ac , and T increases on steady state economic growth. The intuition behind this result is somewhat involved. From (38), it is clear that the "AT= +1"Aac = -1" policy has no direct effect on the incentives firms have to imitate. The "AT = +1,Actc = -1" policy essentially drives the resource costs of imitative activities down and the monetary costs of imitative activities up. This means that for the same amount of imitative activity, the "AT = +1,Aa c = -1" policy frees up some labor in the world economy that had been employed in the imitative R&D sector to do other things, and this freed up labor represents one reason why the "AT = +1,Aa c = -1" policy generates higher economic growth. The "AT = +1,Aac = -1" policy also makes innovative R&D more attractive for firms since successful innovators do not lose as much when imitation occurs.
But since firms earn zero profits in innovative R&D, the "AT= +1,Aac = -1" policy must also generate higher imitative R&D C* to counterbalance this benefit. And the higher C* represents the other reason why the "AT = +1,Aa c = -1" policy generates higher economic growth. The higher C* essentially means that there are more industries in the economy where firms are engaging in innovative activities. 
Appendix
I will begin by examining whether firms producing different quality products in an industry can effectively collude. The most favorable scenerio for collusion occurs when the industry in question has only one firm producing the state-of-the-art quality product (firm 0) and only one firm producing the next lower quality product (firm 1). Let ( po ,pp do,d) define a collusive agreement between these two firms, where p, is the price firm i agrees to charge, and d, is the quantity that firm i agrees to sell at price p, pi > 1 and di > 0 for all i,and po = Xpl must be satisfied, because otherwise one of the firms would have nothing to gain by colluding. Furthermore, the quantities produced must exactly satisfy demand, that is,
The collusive profits of fain 0,
must be greater than the profits n` (given by (10)) that firm 0 could earn by not colluding. It follows that x< 1/X X. The collusive profits of firm 1 satisfy
By cheating on this collusive agreement and infinitesimally undercutting the other firm, firm 1 can earn cheating profits of 
Cheat
Since Er' =ni ne's x< / X, from (A4), the following assumption
guarantees that firms producing different quality products is an industry cannot effectively collude in the steady state equilibrium. I will assume that the innovations under consideration are of a sufficiently large magnitude so that A3 is satisfied. Thus this paper focuses in on the special case of "big innovations".
To justify (11), I must show that two firms producing the state-of-the-art quality product can collude, that is, that (14) is satisfied. It is helpful to consider the following inequalities,
where the first inequality follows from A3 and the second inequality is (14) rearranged.
Trivially, (A5) can only hold if
To establish (A5), I will consider each of the two cases: (i) 2a al , and (ii) a,> 2ac , in turn. I will assume that the labor endowment is in this range, that is, A5 L is sufficiently small so that (A6) holds, and I satisfies (A5).
A2 and AS together state that the economy-wide labor endowment is large enough so that both innovative and imitative investment activities are profitable, but not so large that two quality leaders cannot collude (because of a very rapid rate of innovation generated by a very large labor force).
In the steady state equilibrium, an outside fringe of competitive firms 19 engages in I* units of innovative R&D in each industry with 2 (or more) leaders and engages in C* units of imitative R&D in each industry with a single quality leader. These firms earn expected discounted equilibrium profits of zero from engaging in R&D. Given (21), (20) implies that no fringe firm has anything to gain by doing more (or less) imitative R&D in any "a industry" and 19 Neither the quality leader(s) or any follower one step down in the quality ladder engages in any R&D in the steady state equilibrium. I begin by exploring whether a quality leader in an "a industry" has anything to gain by doing innovative R&D. If the quality leader does innovate, it is in a position to earn profits lt = (1-(1 / A.2))E for some period of time since it is now price constrained by two followers two quality levels down. Since a competitive fringe of firms is going to be trying to imitate it, at best, its profits are threatened by a rate C* of imitative R&D. However, firms have more to gain by imitating it than any leader in an "a industry" since successful imitators can now earn the profit flow n = (1-(1/ A,2))E / 2 > (1-(1/A))E/ 2 . Thus the competitive fringe of firms have an incentiveto choose OK -a +o in this industry and the innovator earns the profits It = (1-(1 / V))E for a negligable period of time before imitation occurs. After imitation occurs by some firm in the competitive fringe, the two quality leaders at best earn the collusive profits TE = (1-(1 / X2))E I 2 until the innovative R&D P eliminates these profits (these two firms cannot benefit from further imitation since A3 implies that IC (1-(1 / X2))E / 2 > E / 3). Thus the relevant (Deviant) payoff for an industry leader in an "a industry" engaging in innovative
Substituting into (A7) using (21) and (27), and then differentiating with respect to I yields
The inequality follows from A3. Thus a quality leader in an "a industry" has no incentive to engage in innovative R&D.
(A8) Does a quality leader in a "fi industry" have anything to gain by doing innovative R&D? A competitive fringe of firms engage in l* units of innovative R&D in each 13 industry" and earn zero expected discounted profits from doing so. Thus a quality leader can only gain if the reward for successfully innovating is greater than for these firms in the competitive fringe.
But the profit flow for this quality leader after further innovation is given by (10) and since it is price constrained by only one follower firm, this follower (one quality level down) has more to gain by imitating [it = (1-(1 / X2))E 12] than any other firm. Thus the follower has an incentive to devote arbitrarily large resources to imitative R&D and the leader's profits (10) are earned for a negligible period of time before imitation occurs. After this imitation occurs, the quality leader earns profits It = (1-(1 / A,I)E 12 and the best that it can hope for is to earn these collusive profits until a competitive fringe firm innovates again [It= (1-(1/ X2))E / 2>E/3 for iti > 2 ].
Thus the relevant payoff for an industry leader in an "13 industry" engaging in innovative R&D I is (A9) vr,
Substituting into (A9) using (11) and (21), and then differentiating with respect to I yields
The inequality follows from Al and A3. Thus a quality leader in an 13 industry" has no incentive to engage in innovative R&D. Does a fum one quality level down in an "a industry" have anything to gain by engaging in innovative R&D? If if succeeds, it earns profits (10) until it is imitated. But the previous quality leader, the firm that if now one quality level down, has more to gain by imitating than any other firm [it = (1-(1 / 1.2))E / 2 > (1 -(1 Ot..))E / 2] and thus it has an incentive to devote arbitrarily large resources to imitative R&D. 20 As a result, the quality leader can expect to earn the profits (10) for a negligible period of time before imitation occurs. After imitation occurs, it earns the profits it = 1 -(1 / X2))E I 2 until, in the most favorable scenario, a competitive fringe firm innovates. Thus the relevant payoff for an industry follower in an "a industry" engaging in innovative R&D I is (All) v9= p I* where the last equality follows from (27). Thus, with the competitive fringe of firms engaging in I* units of innovative R&D, a firm one quality level down has nothing to gain by also doing innovative R&D. Does a firm one quality level down in an "a industry" have anything to gain by engaging in imitative R&D? A competitive fringe of firms is already engaging in C* units of 20 The same condition (14) that guarantees that firms one step above followers in the quality ladder can collude also guarantees that firms two steps above followers can collude.
21 Essentially, follower firms in industries with a single quality leader do not try to innovate because, if successful, they are vulnerable to quick imitation by the previous quality leader.
[(1-(1 /1.2 ))E 12 imitative R&D, in expectation that if they are successful, they will earn collusive profits (11) until further innovation occurs. Since these competitive fringe firms earn zero expected discounted profits from engaging in imitative R&D, a follower firm can only possibly gain by engaging in imitative R&D if it expects to earn higher profits upon successfully imitating, and this can only possibly happen if its product is copied by the sole firm one quality level down.
Then each quality leader would earn (at most) profits E /3 until a competitive fringe firm innovates. But A3 implies that E 13 < 7C C . Thus imitation does not help the firm being imitated and followers have no incentive to engage in imitative R&D in "a industries". Does a firm one quality level down in a "ft industry" have anything to gain by engaging in imitative R&D? A competitive fringe of firms is already engaged in I* units of innovative R&D in such an industry. Thus, by successfully imitating, this follower firm will become one of three leaders and (at best) earn collusive profits n= (1-(1 / X))E /3 until either further innovation or further imitation occurs. If further innovation occurs, it wipes out the imitator's profits and if further imitation occurs, at best, these collusive profits become it = E / 4 . In the first case, the relevant payoff for an industry follower in an "fs industry" engaging in imitative 1 X 1 a CI 22 The absence of imitation in industries with two quality leaders rests on the assumption that the cost of imitation for a third firm is just as high as it is for the second. It may be fruitful to relax this assumption in future research.
What happens if a competitive fringe firm engages in innovative R&D in an "a industry"? If it succeeds in innovating, it earns profits (10) until imitation occurs. The previous quality leader has the most to gain by imitating since IC = (1-(1 / A.2))E / 2 > (1 -(1 / X))EI 2 and since this firm has an incentive to devote arbitrarily large resources to imitative R&D, imitation can be expected to take negligible time. Since A3 guarantees that rc = (1-(1 / A. 2))E/ 2 >E /3 , the best scenario for the innovator is that it earns the collusive profits lc = (1-(1 / X 2))E l 2 until further innovation occurs. Then the relevant payoff for an competitive fringe firm engaging in innovative R&D I in an "a industry" is given by (All) and I can conclude that a competitive fringe firm does not have any incentive to engage in innovative R&D in an "a industry".
Finally, what happens when a competitive fringe firm engages in imitative R&D in a "I3 industry"? If it succeeds in imitating, it earns at best collusive profits IC = (1-(1 / X)) E /3 until further innovation occurs since A3 guarantees that it = (1-(1 / A.))E /3 > EIS. Thus the relevant payoff for a competitive fringe firm in a "0 industry" engaging in imitative R&D C is given by (A13) and this competitive fringe firm does not have any incentive to engage in imitative R&D in a "ii industry". C
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